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1The External Commercial Policies of Richelieu
Introduction
The age of Richelieu, although recognized as being one
of the most important periods in the political development of
France, has up to the present, been more or less neglected on the
economic side. Many writers in the past and in the present have
carefully and indeed most vividly characterized Richelieu as a
statesman, diplomat, and patron of art and learning of the first
rank, but have paid little attention to the economic phases of
his administration, and especially to his external commercial poli-
cies. For example, M . Caillet in his book on "The Administration
of Richelieu" (1) says that most writers do not give him the proper
amount of attention on the administrative side. "Voltaire", he
goes on to say, "in his Sie'cie de Louis XIV
,
simply mentions the
fact that he made it flourishing without but not within. The
History of P. Griffith contains almost nothing about the most im-
portant administrative acts of that period." He then concludes by
pointing out the fact that his treatment of the Cardinal will in-
clude not only his administrative activities, but the ideas he had
on this phase of his career as well. But Richelieu has been neg-
lected by economists as well as by historians. One writer on po-
litical economy covers the period of Louis XIV in a brief para-
graph (2). "Between the administration of Sully and that of
(1) . Caillet, L* administration en France sous le ministre du
1 Cardinal Richelieu
,
Introduction, p. VII.
( 2 ) . Bianqui , History of Political Economy, p. 279.

2Colbert", he says, "was that of the two priests
Fichelieu and Mazarin, both wasteful of their means though from
different motives. Colbert was, in fact, the only minister who ha;
a system settled, complete, and consistent in all parts." He then
goes on to relate the various contributions of this man, paying
absolutely no more attention to the cardinal. But the author of
the above quotation is not the only writer who has slighted that
period on the economic side; it is a charge which can be brought
with more or less justice against most writers who deal with the
period. Such being the case, because of the failure to bring out
Richelieu's ideas and actual accomplishments in regard to his ex-
ternal commercial policies, the present thesis is going to try to
bring out the ideas and activities of the cardinal so far as they
concern part of the economic phase of his career. In other words,
an effort will be made to find out if authors in the past have
been justified in slighting Richelieu on the external commercial
side (1).
Now, in taking up the side of Richelieu's economic ideas
and accomplishments, one finds that a study must be made of what
he thought and did as regards a war marine, colonization, and com-
merce in general. These three phases of his external commercial
policies are to a certain extent related. For example, the car-
dinal desired a war marine because he wanted to aid and protect
colonization and commerce. Further, there was a general influencej
(l). It is hoped that the internal phase of his economic policiet
can be treated likewise in the near future.

3abroad which caused Richelieu to pay no small amount of attention
to those phases of his administrative duties, and that was the econ-
omic conditions of Europe at the period when he came into power.
According to one writer on political economy (1), the
age of Richelieu is found in the record of the three phases of the
modern period as interpreted by economic history. In this second
phase, he says, "which opens with the beginning of the 16th Century,
the spontaneous collapse of the medieval structure is followed by a
series of systematic assaults which still further disorganizes it.
During this phase the central temporal power,, which has made a great
advance in stability and resources, lays hold of the rising element;:
of manufacture and commerce, and seeks, while satisfying the popular
enthusiasm for their promotion, to use them for political ends, and
make them subserve its own strength and splendour by furnishing the
treasure necessary for military use. With this practical effort
and the social tendencies on which it rests, the mercantile school
of political economy, which then obtained a spontaneous ascendency,
is in close relation. Thus we find that Richelieu came into power
just at the time when the mercantile theory was at its zenith, when
nations were beginning to realize their individual strength, and
when the value of centralization of power and wealth was almost
overemphasized. But before taking up the effect of this doctrine
on the important nations of Europe, just a word as to what the mer-
cantile theory really was.
It was a doctrine "whose essence", says Schmoller, "lies
not in the tariff barriers, but in something far greater, namely,
(1). Ingram, The History of Political Economy, pp. 32-33.

4the total transformation of society and its organization, as well
as/the state and its institutions; in the replacing of a local
and territorial economic policy by that of the state"(l). Another
writer, reviewing the system so far as it affects nations in their
relations to each other, maintains that under it, "each nation, as
a whole, worked for its own power. The entered into a competitive
struggle in the economic no less than in the political field, suc-
cess in the former being, indeed, bji the rules, regarded as instru-
mental to preeminence in the Latter. A national economic interest
came to exist, of which the government made itself the representa-
tive head" (2). Thus one sees that the doctrine, in general, was one
which is followed even to the present day. Furthermore, it wan an
economic theory which has been followed by a great many political
and administrative leaders down to the present time, and so far as
concerns this part of the mercantile system, Richelieu is no ex-
ception, as this thesis will try to prove. However, there existed
at that time an extreme mercantile doctrine, which the cardinal
did not follow, even though it was the common belief of the time.
The upholders of this form of the mercantile system believed that
gold was wealth, that the balance of trade should always be favor-
able, and that a nation could only be strong and powerful by ob-
taining and keeping a large supply of gold within the confines of
its own territory.
sented striking examples of this extreme theory. At that time the
former country was just beginning her colonizing expeditions to
America. Now one of the predominating causes of these enterprises
The policies of the governments of England and Spain pre
(1) .
(2) .
Schmoller, " The Mercantile System
,
p. 51.
Ingram, History of Political Ec onomy, p. 59

5was the desire to get gold, and while religious motives played an
important part in causing the different expeditions to America,
nevertheless the extreme economic doctrine had a great and in-
creasing influence on the settlements in the new world and their
relations with the mother country. Adam Smith and his "Wealth of
Nations" had not appeared as yet to influence the English nation.
Gold was wealth to the Englishman of that age, and the belief com-
prehended ail his economical activities. However, England was not
so ardent an exponent of this doctrine as was Spain, for all the
latters commercial and colonial activities were influenced by the
single ambition, "to get gold".
The most interesting illustration of this mercantile
theory in action is found in a study of the discovery, conquest,
and settlement of South America by the Spanish. The deeds of
Cortez in Mexico and Pizarro in Peru are two excellent examples of
the mad scramble for gold at that time. Also, the commercial re-
lations of the Spanish colonies in the south with Spain, as con-
trolled by the former's council of the Indies, reveals the narrow
economic doctrines of the day, and well illustrates the policy of
exclusion carried on by countries which had colonies in other con-
tinents. It was held that the Spanish colonies could trade with
Spain alone, and that the balance of trade must always be in favor
of the home country.
This extreme economic theory was common to all European
nations at that time, and was a part of the natural development
out of the past. "The development of the universe", says Mr.
Bridges (1), "was destined to supersede and replace the old system
(I).
, Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert
, pp. 5-10.

6based on individual activity and scientific conviction as opposed
tc^activity and supernatural beliefs of the midtdle ages. It was
thus a gradual change from one to the other, industry being sub-
stituted for warfare" (1). Thus one concludes that the particular
development of early modern commerce and the resulting economic
mercantile doctrine was the natural outcome of the breaking down or
rather the evolution of the different practices in the past; also
that the extreme theory was the natural product of the nev/ age of
commercialism and colonization. As a result one finds that during
this period there began a great commercial and colonial development
which, although it was handicapped to a certain extent by many mis-
taken economic ideas, yet greatly influenced the history and devel-
opment, in all directions, of all the important European nations
of that time.
The discovery of America opened an avenue of industrial
development to all countries. This resulted in an intensive stim-
ulation of commercial and colonial projects, which in time affected
them all. France in common with these other lands saw the great
field open to her. She had begun to find herself internally, why
not externally also? Richelieu had this problem to solve when
he came into power, and what he did and intended to do in develop-
ing the external commercial power of France is, as before Stated,
the purpose of this thesis.
Accordingly, besides trying to find out Richelieu's
economic accomplishments and ideas in regard to building up a war
marine, colonization, and general commercial relations, the attempt
(l).
. . Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert, pp. 5-10.

7will also be made to determine as results of the investigat inn,
his actual relations to the mercantile doctrine, and his economic
importance
.

8Chapter I
The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu as Regards
a War Marine.
The keynote of Richelieu's position in regard to a war
marine for France is found in the following quotation taken from
his Testament Politique . "The sea is an object of dispute among
all sovereigns, for they all claim that they inherit the right to
control it. Therefore, the factor which does so is force and not
reason. It is indeed necessary to be powerful in order to have a
recognized claim in that heritage" (1). The cardinal then takes
up the maritime organization of England, Spain, and the Barbary
States, compares the naval forces of these, and shows briefly how
he wished to make the French strong and active anough to be able
in times of war to contend with advantage against the fleets of
their enemies, and in time of peace, to defend their commerce, ships:
and shores from the aggression of pirates.
Richelieu was given the opportunity to carry out his ideas
along this line when, in 1627, he was offered the position of
"Grand Master, Chief, and Superintendent General of the Navigation
and Commerce of France". The duties of this office had been carriec
on by several officials in the past, and were now put under the con-
trol of the cardinal, as a further move toward the centralization
of power which was going on at that time. Some of the duties of
this position were as follows: "To give and furnish ail orders which
will be useful and necessary for navigation, in conservation of the
(i). Richelieu, Testament Politique
, V. 2, pp. 48-50.

9rights of France, the advancement and establishment of the commerce
and security of her subjects at sea, in the ports, harbors, and
nearby islands " ( i ) . Thus we perceive that the powers which Rich-
elieu was to possess were very extended? indeed, the appointment
placed under his control the merchant as well as the war marine.
The duties of the cardinal were defined more definitely than :iere
those of his predecessors, and furthermore, they were broader in sc
far as they concerned the necessary field, so that he was able to
decide as a sovereign ruler, all questions relating to the sea,
even to disputes arising over the capture and the disposal of the
contents of wrecked vessels. That he took his office seriously
and tried to realize vast plans for the maritime and commercial
development of France is the final conclusion of most students of
his life.
The way in which Richelieu carried on the duties of his
office will illustrate both his impartiality and his honesty.
Numerous extracts from his letters show that he looked upon the
position as a sort of sacred trust. Indeed the cardinal considered
the appointment as being one which was not conferred upon him as
a regular part of his official position, but was given to him with
the idea that its grefrt importance to the welfare of the nation
and its king required every loyal Frenchman not only to obey its
precepts but to aid in carrying out its functions if he was order-
ed to do so(2). This explains why the cardinal refused to accept
(1) . ( Isambert t. XVI. p. 194 ) Quoted inCaillet, pp. 288-290.
(2) . CaUlet
, pp. 288-90.
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money for his work in this particular office(l). One of his let-
ters illustrates very well the spirit in which he took up his duties
and some of the problems he had to face at the very outset(2). He
says "that the king, knowing for some time how his vessels were pr
upon, was determined to put a stop to it. So he sent out escorts
with the various merchant vessels and fortified all the ports. Alsol
his majesty ordered me to take charge of commerce and navigation,
and has sent forward a general order that clearance was to be taken
from me rather than from Montmorency (his predecessor) "
He then goes on to cite cases in which his authority was not recog-
nized, (indeed, there existed at that time provinces where local
governments exerted almost unrestricted rights, and thus conflicted
with the central authority, which was at that time the "superin-
tendent of navigation and commerce".) In regard to Brittany, one
of the more or less independent provinces, he says that he d oes not
seek to make innovations there, but only tries to give aid and the
means to all those who wish to trade, and to do so in pleasing and
favorable ways. Many other letters indicate his great interest in
the office(3). And so one finds that after this, he begins to in-
troduce important plans in regard to forming a war marine, which was
to be of great importance to France in the future. But first a few
words in respect to the war marine of France.
Francis I and Henry II had attempted to build up the navy,
but since then it had dwindled to nothing. In 1603 Suily, as an
. (1). Riche l ieu's Letters
,
V. 2, p. 346 (Collection Documents inedits
1' Historie de France)
(2) . Ibid, pp. 350-352.
(3) . Ibid, pp. 38, 349-350. (Year- 1627). Vol 2, pp. 409-12: d. 416

uambassador of France, was obliged to be carried to England in an
English vessel. Indeed naval affairs remained in about the same
state up to the time when the firm and well-trained hand of Riche-
lieu gave a new and vigorous impulse to all departments of the
government. "This great minister," says Garland, "who wished to
found the political preponderance of France, did not fail to work
for the development of the natural and commercial power of our
country. The execution of his great project necessitated some new
resources which could only come from an increase of national riches,
The restoration of foreign commerce was one of his most vital pre-
occupations. It opened to him a great path which Henry IV had
(1)
foreseen but which he had not been able to enter t " Thus one
must conclude that with Richelieu began the real war marine of
France, as nothing of importance had been accomplished before his
time
.
But Richelieu was influenced by other more direct causes
than simply the fact that when he received the office of superin-
tendent of navigation and the powers that went with it he was im-
pelled to take action along the line of devebping a war marine. It
is generally conceded that his main purpose in building up a navy
was to defend France from her enemies. Several causes, however,
brought about this more more general idea, and one of them was the
depredations committed against France by the Barbary pirates.
The inhabitants of Northern Africa had for many gener-
ations followed piracy as a profession, and at that time dominated
the Mediterranean Sea. They had been so strong that it was almost
impossible for a French vessel to venture out of a Mediterranean
port without running the risk of being captured and its crew
_.(!).(Ch. Garaud, Rist. de France, p. 1907) Caiilet, p. 2R7
.
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taken to Africa as slaves. Indeed these daring individuals had
even attempted recently to loot Franch ports. On account of theso
raids, Richelieu, in the second year of his ministry, made a
"reglement pour la mer',' in which he brought out the necessity of
a strong war marine for France. "In order to guarantee to our
subjects who trade in the East safety from the losses which they
have received from the pirates, and to maintain the reputation
and dignity of our crown among foreigners, we wish that in the
future there will always be in our ports forty galleys, prepared
to go out quickly and scour our coasts" (1). As a result, Rich-
elieu did all he could to make France able to resist the pirates
on the high seas and force them to respect the flag of France.
But he had to meet other enemies on the waters besides the Barbary
pirates
.
During Richelieu's entire administration the relations
between France and England were extremely unfriendly. Also,
Spain was feared by r ichelieu as a nation opposed to the progress
of the French nation. As a result of this enmity, common to all
three nations, the cardinal found himself conducting a desultory
warfare with the other countries most of the time. Nov; to meet
them on e ;ual terms, he realized that a strong war marine \vas a
necessity. He knew that this was the weak spot in the French
power, and was the cause of her rather unfortunate foreign rela-
tions. Now if she was to be politically and commercially strong,
she must be able to protect herself on the sea, against the at-
tacks of all her enemies. France has always built up her war
(1). The letters of Richelieu , Vol. 2, pp. 163-166.

13
marine with the idea of protection on the sea in view. In fact,
though it
the policy of a strong navjr instituted by Richelieu/dwindled away
after his death, was revived again during the age of Louis XIV,
and at various periods since then. It is being strongly agitated
at the present time. France has indeed found out after many re-
verses that if Richelieu's ideas on the subject had been uniformly
carried out it might have changed her entire political and commer-
cial carreer.
The best source of his ideas on the particular subject
is found in his "Political Testament" (1), where, after discussing
the advantage of certain types of ships on the ocean and the Medi-
nevar
terranean sea, he ^oes on to say that a great state should/be in
such a position that it had to receive an injury without taking a
just revenge. He points out the supremacy of the English over the
French at sea. "This," he says, "works as an injury to the com-
merce of France, especially to her fisheries". He then comments
on the fact that England and not France can fix the duties on com-
modities because of her strength at sea. The latter in her
state of weakness could do nothing. He goes on to relate an in-
cident in which the British flag had to be saluted in preference
to the French standard because of the naval inferiority of the
latter. In conclusion, he says that only force will make England
recognize France.
He then takes up the naval strength of Spain, pointing out
the fact that the utilitiy of the Indies to Spain compelled her to
j
have a large sea force. "We should be able", he says, " to oppose
(1). ] ichelieu, Testament Politique , Vol. 2, pp. 49-52.
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and put a stop to any of these enterprises against us. If your
majesty is powerful at sea, you will be able to attack Spain on
her lengthy coast, and they will consume most of their revenues
in an effort to guard their territory. This will keep them from
troubling their neighbors as they have done up to the present,
for they will need all the power they have to protect themselves
"(1). He closes this section by describing the excellent
location of France in respect to harbors, emphasizing the fact thai
She has ports on the ocean and the sea as well. This is an immense
advantage. Then he comments in more detail on her excellent ports.
"Brittany alone," he says, "contains the best harbors on the
ocean, and Provence has better ones than I ngland and Italy together.
Spain has to have a large navy in order to keep her many separate
ports under control. Just as the sea divides Spain from Italy, so
France separates her from the rest of her territories" (2). Thus
we see that Richelieu realized very clearly the importance of a
war marine to France because of her weakness on the political and
commercial side in her relations with foreign countries. These
quotations taken from his Political Testament give his final ideas
on the subject, and on account of this are of double importance,
because they are the thoughts of a man who had spent twenty -five
years of his life in attempting to solve the political and economic
problems of his native land.
(1) . Richelieu, Testament Politique , Vol. 2, pp. 52-55.
(2) . The Spanish Netherlands, Luxemburg, and the Franche Comte
Were the important territories separated from Spain by the Franch
nation.
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There was yet another cause which influenced him to build
up a war marine. This was the rising colonial trade of France and
her growing commerce as a consequence of it. Richelieu realized
that in order to develop and protect colonies a strong navy was a
necessity. Now as he wanted France to be a powerful colonizing na-
tion, it was natural that he should turn toward the development of
a navy as one of the first steps in the promotion of this idea. Thii
Cardinal seems also to have felt that the entire commercial develop-
ment of the nation depended on the increase of her war marine. "If
the king," he says, "endures the injuries, violence, and depredations!
which are every day canmitted upon his subjects by foreigners, and if
we continue to have a fleet in the condition in which it is at
present; if it is necessary to endure the heavy duties which for-
eigners place upon the merchandise which we ship them and that which
they ship to us, the actual power of France will be ruined." (1)
As a remedy he advises that a strong naval marine be built up for
the perpetual protection of commerce. He seemed to realize from tho
first the advantage of a war marine to France, and the siege of La
Rochelle in the early years of his administration brought out most
emphatically its value on the political side. Indeed, continual
wars with the different foreign nations and with the Barbary states
kept what fleet he did have busy from the start, and on account of
this, he was not able to carry out all the commercial plans he had
in view, so that this fleet really benefitted him more on the po-
litical than on the commercial side. But. the dire need of a
navy was really brought to his attention during the siege of La
(1). Richelieu's Letters , Vol. II, pp. 331-32.
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Rochelle. He realized that a strong war marine was the thing which
France lacked but really needed. Then came the unfriendly relation
with Spain; and finally colonization projects, all of which empha-
sized to him the desirability of a strong navy.
It was during the years 1629 to 1635 that Richelieu first
began seriously to consider this phase of his administrat ion( 1)
.
He looked over the faults and the strong points of other foreign
nations, and then began to consider steps to be taken in order to
place France in control of the sea. He decided that conditions in
the land in so far as they affected the creation of a war marine,
should be investigated. Accordingly, in 1629 and 1633, he ordered
two of the best trained men in the kingdom, Messrs Leroux d'lnfre--
viile, commissioner of the marine, amd Henri de Seguiran, Seigneur
de Bone, knight and councillor of the king, to carry out this pro-
ject. The former was to inspect the coast bordering on the ocean,
and the latter that bordering on the Mediterranean. They were to
make a report upon everything which concerned the marine and were
also to reestablish the right of anchorage, which Henry IV had
yielded to foreign vessels. "These duties, executed with rare in-
telligence, cast a rather depressing light upon the deplorable
situation in which they found all the forms of sea activities, a
situation rendered still worse by the conflicts of jurisdiction
which were being continually brought up by the governors of provinn
ces or the admirals or the nobles whose feudal estates bordered on
(1). Caiilet
,
p. 292.
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the oceans and rivers'. (1). These men reported that the ports
were without garrisons, that the coast of the ocean was harried by
the pirates from Africa dnd Spain, and that the harbors and the
castles built around them, both on the Atlantic Ocean and the Med-
iterranean Sea, were in a very unfortunate state of neglect. In ad-
dition to all this, there were "river rulers" who exacted tolls from
travelers who went up or down the rivers which passed through their
territories. They reported in detailed fashion as to the condition
of the coast of France in regard to the duties collected, armaments,
boats, the means of defence in the ^orts, the spirit of the inhabi-
tants of the coast towns, the number of ships occupied in navigation,
and the number of their sailors, carpenters, pilots, and captains.
Finally they gave an exact analysis of the different claims of the
dukedoms, syndicates, and corporations in France, and recommended
as a result, that his majesty provide war vessels to protect the
commercial ships as well as the ports. (2).
As a result of these reports, RichelieM-became aware of the
fact that trade was at its lowest point; that other nations because
of the weak marine of France could do what they wanted so far as
concerned their relations with France; and that the position of
France both in the Bast and the Y/est was becoming worse. He came
to the conclusion that something must be done to build up its weak
and almost rotten fortifications and its small and almost useless
}
navy, if France was to command the respect of foreign nations and
even of the pirates,
(1) . Caiilet
, pp. 292-4.
(2) . Sue , Te correspondance de Scurdis, V . 1, pp. XXXI -XXXI I.

One cannot but admire the immense activity of this great
man, who, in the midst of many physical ills and petty political
troubles, was able to suppress numerous abuses, to overcome count-
less differences of opinion, and to rebuild the fighting and mer-
chant marine of his country. How he went about the task can best
be explained at this point.
The work of Richelieu in regard to a war marine might be
broadly classified in the following manner! 1): (1) laws relating
to maritime authority and accountability (the bureau of accounts);
(2) the formation of a "personal marine"; (3) the restoration of
dilapidated coast fortifications and the creation of new ones;
(4) the creation of a war marine and of naval equipment. A brief
consideration of the above is justifiable.
Richelieu in taking up that part of his work which was
concerned with the passing of laws governing affairs on the sea,
displayed not only his fairness to all other sea powers, but his
knowledge of matters pertaining to the marine. He coon placed
the control and conduct of all acts relating to it in the hands of
definitely assigned officials. The latter formed what was called
his "personal marine", and they conducted and managed affairs re-
lating to the sea according to fixed rules and regulations imposed
by him. In other \Vbrds, he tried to put an end to the conflict
of authority existing in France in respect to the control of mil-
itary affairs. Seven Bureaus of Admiralty were established, to
be composed of officials already appointed by certain individuals
and in the future to be nominated by the Cardinal himself and his
(1). Caillet
, pp. 301-302.
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successors, who were ''grand masters of France" (1). They were to
have under their control all criminal and civil affairs and all
acts connected with the state government and navigation on the high
seas. Also they were to have charge of the proper disposal of
wreckage.
In carrying out his schemes relating to the formation of
a marine, we find tliat Richelieu even went so far into details as
to change the method of getting sailors, which had hitherto been
one of the great causes of the weakness cf the French on the sea.
He had a census taken of the number and addresses of sailors and
carpenters in every harbor in France. He ascertained the number
of vessels and their equipment and the number and size of the harbors,
and from that information as a basis he determined the number of
sailors to be furnished by each province, and the amount of money
that might be levied for ships and their equipment. In addition
to all this, he established schools for pilots, put the coast in a
state of 'defense, created new ports and enlarged others, and finally
established three large naval arsenals. "He spent over 359,000 livres
in 1635 for the fortifications of Brouage d'0rl8*ans and the Island
of Re. He wanted to make the former the center of maritime power
upon the ocean. He strengthened the ports on the Mediterranean
in a similar fashion, especially Toulcn , which he desired to make
the war center of the nation on that coast w ( 2). However, the crux
(1) . (Recueii d'ordonnances tant manuscrites qu' impHmees , 2 vol.
in-40, t. 1, p. 280 ( Biblioth.du ministere de la marine), quoted
in Cai ilet
,
pp. 303. ...
(2) . (Etats statistiques de la marine de France pour I'anne 1635,
corresp. de Sourdis, I, III, p. 523.) Caiilet, 308.
(3) . Caiilet, p. 30.
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of his efforts in building up the power of France on the sea, lay-
in the increase of the number of war vessels and the enlarged
equipment.
Henry Iv* had realized the necessity of a fleet, but it
was left to Richelieu to carry this idea into execution. "He re-
solved," says Caillet, "to endow France with a military marine,
that is to say a military force truly belonging to the state, and
not furnished by cities as had previously been the case"(l). Up
to this time there had existed the custom of allowing particular
individuals or certain interests to put out vessels and rent them
to merchants for their protection, or to use them to prey on the
enemies of the French people. But Richelieu saw that this was not
a good thing, so that after he had triumphed over the Huguenots^ he
too great care to hold all ports accountable to himself, and to make
himself master of all the magazines and of all the cannons and
other war materials. Lastly he forbade all vessels to bear arms
unless they had royal permission.
Under the orders of the council of notables in 1626, which
had really been called and conducted under the direction of Riche-
lieu, the fleets of war vessels were greatly increased. 3ut it
took time before the maritime service was really ivell organized! 2)
.
when
As late as 1626/France wished to put an end to the ravages which
were being made by the Barbary pirates on the ocean, they could not
find enough vessels to carry out the task and had to get twenty
from Holland. It was particularly during the siege of La Rochelle
(1) . Caillet
,
p. 310.
(2) . Ibid, p. 314.
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as has been said before, the Richelieu felt the inferiority of the
Franch war marine. After that he set aside a certain sum each year
for the creation of a navy.
From 1630 to 1634, the naval power of France gradually
increased, and finally consisted of three large squadrons. As a
result the pirates were suppressed for the time being, and Spain
was thrust aside so far as her claims on the sea were concerned.
"It was to be for France and for the great minister who had in-
creased his country's reputation so much, a just subject of pride
when their fleet of eighty-five vessels passed triumphantly across
the sea, where some years before she had possessed a fleet less
powerful than that of the smallest city of Italy"(l). He must
have realized that he had now in his possession the implement by
which he could carry out many of his political and economic plans
to the glorious ends which his fertile brain had assigned to them.
Thus the Cardinal saw his plans reach what seemed to be
a successful conclusion. But death took him away just at the time
when he was most needed. The splendid fleet, like a flower nipped
by an unexpected frost, dwindled away almost to nothing after his
departure. The good fruits of his work along this line were mostly
temporary. No one took up this task which he had so well begun,
until the age of Colbert, and then it was too late.
But before we conclude, let us consider briefly the im-
portance of his work so far as it concerns the navy of France.
L. P. Forinier in the preface of his great work entitled "Richelieu 1
writes with much enthusiasm concerning the progress of the maritime
(1). C aillet
, p. 311.
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power under Louis XIII. "Favored with the admiration of the world,'
he says. to Louis XIII, to whom he dedicated the book, "France now
finds herself famous thru your victories. She now sees the great
navy and the harbors open to receive and fortified to protect them.
TTell suppled magazines are established on both coasts. All of
which is equally useful in the promotion of commerce as well as
warfare Your majesty's fleets have controlled things on the
Mediterranean. Indeed Spain has been forced to acknowledge the
power of the French fleet and thus future glory must be approach-
ing'^).
As a result, one must conclude that so far as developing
a war marine is concerned, i ichelieu was able to give it a start
which, if it had been continued and enlarged as he had planned,
would probably have had a strong influence on French history on
the political and still more on the economic side. That he was in-
fluenced by his ideas on commerce, colonization, and other develop-
ment, is. quite evident, if one studies his letters and his other
writings
.
M. "asson, in his "Histolre du Corar.erce Francaise en
XVII^Siecle dans le Levant ", continually emphasizes the point that
it was the development of a navy under the Cardinal that kept up
the Eastern trade of France with the Levant, which was on the de-
crease at that time because of the lack of protect ion( 2 ) . M. Sue
also sums up the work of Richelieu very appropriately when he
(1) . Caillet
, p. 315.
(2) . Mas son, p. 117.
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points out that when the great Cardinal built up the navy, he
Laid the foundations of a great and beautiful system of military
marine, which would serve as an offensive arm to combat the ene-
mies of France, and as a shield or protection to aid her commerce,
and thus by making transportation of goods safer he made them
cheaper, which in turn aided in keeping up the cost of the war
marine(l). The Cardinal's economic turn of mind is very well
illustrated in the above passage. He evidently intended to pay
for the marine by an increase of taxes on the objects whose prices
were lowered through cheaper transportation. These taxes as a
rule were borne by the merchants themselves. :'His system, 'says
Sue, "was a marvelous exposition of thought, force, and solidarity".
(2). It was carried to extremes by those who came after him, so
that not being sufficiently supported by maritime commerce, the
sea power of France! died from lack of sailors, finances, defenses^
and good harbors. Indeed France has recently adopted again an ac-
tive policy of building up her war marine, and in doing so has
been influenced by the same motives which compelled Richelieu sev-
eral centuries ago to do likewise (3).
What might have been the economic history of France
after Richelieu's time if his policy had been carried out along
the conservative lines indicated in his "Testament Po litique',' is
purely a matter of conjecture. However, one must give the Cardinal
(1) . Sue
,
Correspondence de Sourdis, Vol. I, Introduction, pp?
vii-viii.
(2) . Ibid.
(3)
.
It is very interesting to note the recent attempts to en-
large the French war marine. Indeed the government has taken
such an interest in this part of her administration that she of-fers extensive bounties to fishermen, most of whom would be avail-
able m time of war. The same motives that caused Richelieu to
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due credit for being the first actual founder of a war marine in
France, built up with the purpose of aiding France not only po-
litically but economically; and if his efforts in this part of
his administrative field came to very little in the years to fol-
low, it was not his fault and he really deserves praise not only
for the temporary relief his work in this line afforded, but be-
cause his ideas on the development of a war marine in France have
existed down to the twentieth century and have been put into
actual execution at the present time.
build up a war marine has influenced the people of France to do
likewise during the last few years. She has strengthened her navy
so as to be strong politically and meet her rivals on equal terms,
and also in order that she can be strong economically and thus can
protect her commerce and her colonies from the possible insults of
rival powers. (See Bracq, France under the Republic, p. 34.)
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Chapter II
The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu in
Regard to Colonization.
Before the age of Richelieu, France had accomplished a
little along the lines of colonial development. Indeed the period
in which he came into power was really the time when the settlemen
of North America was in its infancy, so that France had really
not considered very seriously, up to that time, the opportunity of
carrying on colonization projects in the new continents. Outside
of the beginning made by Champlain in North America in 1608, very
little had been accomplished in that line. Furthermore, internal
troubles, religious wars, and unfriendly foreign relations ail
tended to prevent the predecessors of Henry IV from sending any
expeditions of importance outside of the vicinity of France and
Italy. Their desires for territorial expansion were limited to
some possessions in the latter country, and conquest in any other
direction or place was thought to be of little importance. Then,
in the seventeenth century, came the age of Richelieu and with it
a grefct change in the colonial activities of the nation.
Colonial commerce underwent a growth which was unprece-
dented in the history of France. Inspired by the colonial acti-
vities of England and Holland, the cardinal tried to create ideas
in regard to the foundation of great colonization companies which
were more or less new to the French people. "In order to make our
selves masters of the sea, and to form great companies, encourage
merchants to enter and give great privileges to these companies
as they come into existence, just as foreigners have done(l)".
(1). D'Avenel. Richelieu et la Monarche Absolue. V. 3. pp. 209-10.
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Thus one sees that the Cardinal, perceiving the commercial and
colonial expansion of nations like Holland and England, and real-
izing the great gains that they would make along this line, de-
cided to do likewise, and so immediately after he received the
office of head of navigation and commerce, he began to plan com-
mercial companies and aided their establishment in various ways.
Many men who lived at that time have left written accounts which
throw much light upon Richelieu's work in this field.
"The Cardinal," says Mathieu Malipointont in his memoirs,
"wished to present to the assembly of notables in 1527 some new
edicts concerning the state of the marine, trade, and navigation,
in order to justify his position as head of the kingdom. He es-
tablished by means of an edict a perpetual navy of forty-five ves-
sels, which he said would return the French war marine to its
former state of splendor. He also wished to create some important
companies to which he would grant privileges. He then appointed
me to examine the first proposition which was made by Nicolas >.7itt8
Jeandu Meurier^esquire^and other French and Flemish merchants, who
had formed a company called 'La nacelle de Saint Pierre fleur-
delisee with the purpose of establishing in France an immense trade
in all merchandise which enters into commerce, of introducing fish-
eries, of building vessels, and other uncommon duties, and finally
of increasing in value many lands and colonies which have not re-
turned much profit hitherto" ( 1)
.
The text of the agreement adopted by the Cardinal with
respect to this company is found in the notes or memoirs of Llath-
ieu Mole; and as it gives a correct idea of all that relates to
(1). (Mathieu Mole, Memoirs , Bk. 1, pp. 424-48) Caillet, pp. 333-
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the external or internal commerce of the great industries, it seems
best to give the principal articles of this treaty(l), especially
as all the companies formed by Richelieu conformed more or less
rigidly to tMs type.
The provisions of this document were as follows:
f
I. The heads of the company w ere to take over 400 families
! within a month of the day of negotiating the agreement. These
families were to be composed of persons suitable for commerce,
fishing, manufacturing, and agriculture. Besides this, there were
to be sebt no less than twelve vessels completely equipped for the
expedition. By so doing, the aforesaid company would be allowed to
trade both by the seas and rivers and by land, to establish fish-
eries upon the sea, and manufacturing concerns of all sorts, to
plant sugar cane and refine sugar, to work mines, to make porcelain
vessels and crockery by the method of the Indies and of Italy, and
finally, to use all other resources and manufactures 7/hich they
recognize
.
II. All Flemings, Hollanders and others who went over to the col-
onies were to be regarded as Frenchmen and enjoy all their rights.
III. Rewards were offered to those who invested money in the com-
pany or worked in behalf of it. The crown intended to honor those
who took up the work more than ever before in order to attract per-
sons who were capable of aiding the proposition in any way. People
of every condition, clergy, nobles, and officials, could enter and
put their money into the company without injuring their position or
endangering their privileges. Indeed, in order to aid industry
and colonization, his majesty was to ennoble thirty-two persons,
(1). (Mathieu Mole, Memoirs
,
Bk.l, pp. 424-48) Caillet, pp. 334-6.
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whether they were Frenchmen or foreigners, who would enter the com-
pany during the first year of its establishment and put at least
5000 pounds into its funds, without having the power to withdraw
the money for six years, and also to those who did not put any
capital in the enterprise but who placed all their ability and
energy into the advancement of the aforesaid company.
IV. His majesty was to give to the company two sites, not occu-
pied as yet. One was to be on the ocean, the other on the Medi-
terranean. They were to have the power to build houses of business
in those places. In each of these a market was to be established
with fairs (two yearly fairs of eight days each), etc. All inhabi-
tants of said places should be exempt from the payment of the aides
tallies, etc. which fell upon the other ports.
Articles V and VI provided for the government and the
working of the mines in these territories, in which the colonies
were to have, supreme rights, subject only to the final decision of
the grand master of commerce, who was Richelieu.
VII. All vagabonds, beggars, petty criminals, etc. were to be
taken by his majesty's orders into the employ of the company.
VIII. His majesty was to allow the company to undertake voyages
abroad, to establish colonies at advisable places, even in Canada
and New France, to conquer lands beyond those which were under the
control of his majesty, to use them for the profits of the afore-
said company, to which full and entire possession was given, on
condition that they should be faithful and swear homage to his
majesty. The latter also permitted them to trade with ail compa-
nies which were not declared enemies of the kingdom, even countries
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like Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Hamburg
The articles of agreement which were made with the latter nations
had to be communicated to Richelieu as superintendant of commerce
and navigation. Finally, "if the directors of the company should
discover new lands, they could enjoy the fruits of them separate
from any other colonies".
The principal articles of this agreement have been given
because they seem to indicate the main ideas of the Cardinal's pol-
icy toward colonization. It first shows that he desired to develop
the colonies. It illustrates the fact that he desired to found
possessions, which were to be almost self-governing with this one
exception - they were to be responsible to the chief of commerce
and navigation in France. In fact, Richelieu put himself at the
head of almost ill commercial companies founded at that time.
Masson criticizes Richelieu because he made the colonial compa-
nies too centralized, and forced them all to depend on the govern-
ment of France as a final authority. Yet the agreement cited above
seems to give the colonies plenty of leeway to develop without the
interference of the home power. (1)
However, one must not forget to credit Richelieu with
having a knowledge of the value not only of colonization, but also
of commercial manufactures, as illustrated by the passage which says
that the king would ennoble those who first enter the company. Even
though D*Avenel(2) believed that Richelieu made a mistake in his co-
(1) . Masson
, p. 174.
(2) . D' Avenel , Richelieu et la Monarohe Absolue, V.3, pp. 208-27.
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lonial policy and simply issued his pompous "edicts" in order to
create companies and guarantee for them by decree a Long prosper-
ity, one must recognize the fact that his economic policies were
on the whole far in advance of those of his contemporaries and
that there were many other elements entering into French coloni-
zation which account for its failure.
But before one generalizes very much concerning Riche-
lieu's colonial policies, it would seem best to look into the ac-
tual accomplishment of the Cardinal in that particular field of
his administrative duties.
The company whose charter has just been quoted failed
simply because of the lack of credit and funds to maintain it.
Futhermore, the directors did not carry out their promises and
only sought to profit by the monopoly which they possessed and
from which they derived temporary gains. They kept up the pro-
ject with one purpose in view, namely to sell to the colo-
nists who had been sent over^ goods at a high price^and to buy
furs from them as cheaply as possible. Champlain never ceased to
protest against the attitude of the directors toward the colonists
(1). He himself wanted to found a colony which would take up
the three fold purpose of colonization, namely, agriculture, con-
version of the savages, and commerce. The only result of his
plans was the establishment of new fur trading stations in North
America
.
The company of Morbihan was the next to be formed. It
got its name from a port in Brittany in which its counting offi-
ces were established. A group of men called"the Hundred Associat-
(1). Cailiet. pp. 336. Zeller, Richelieu, p. 184.
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es" signed the agreement, so that it was ever after called "The
Hundred Associates Company". Its articles provided f or a perpetu-
al fund to be used for the building of vessels and for the pur-
chase of land. Richelieu, in the name of his Majesty, the King,
gave to them the use of the harbor of Morbihan. They were ~o be
exempt from taxes and were to have their own police rights, and
they could follow their own ideas in regard to the defense of the
port. The other articles were very much like the ones quoted
above for the "New France" agreement.
This company did not last long and also failed completely
and for r/uch the same reasons. But the Cardinal, not to be stopped
by these reverses, began at once to consider plans for the forma-
tion of a new company, which was to establish colonies in North
America. Here they were to have a perpetual monopoly of furs and
pelts and of all other merchandise for five years, and their goods
were to be exempt from all duties upon entering France. The com-
pany on its part agreed to carry over 4000 people in five years to
the new settlements, and make arrangements for their maintenance
during the early period of their colonial existence. As a result
a good class of people were just beginning to come into the land
around Quebec when the English in 1629 threatened the territory
and took it.
In 1632, Champlain pointed ;ut to Richelieu the necessity
for the restitution of New France to the mother country (1). As a
result, the Cardinal sent six armed vessels across the Atlantic
and compelled the English to cede it back. Thus, in 1633, the
(1). Caillet, 343-5.
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company of New France reentered upon all its former rights. Cham-
plain as head of the French colony built up the settlement and com-
panies to a degree never before attained. In 1640 Montreal was
founded, and a fort called Fort Richelieu was established just
above where Quebec is at present, so that by the time of Richelieu's
death, the French possessions in North America had a good start,
and it was not due to any direct fault of his that they failed in
the end
•
M. Caillet (1) in accounting for the decline of the colo-
nies places the blame on the cupidity of the merchants, who neg-
lected agriculture for a selfishly conducted fur trade. Furthermore
religious influence had a tendency to injure the economic develop-
ment of the colonies. Too much emphasis was placed on religion to
the neglect of agriculture. The competition of the English and
Dutch for the Indian trade, and internal dissensions among the In-
dians, the governors, and the colonists, coupled with an increasing
neglect of the colonies by the home government, after Richelieu*
s
time, all tended to ruin the bright future of the French possessions
in America. Some writers maintain that the centralized colonial
policy of the Cardinal was instrumental in bringing about the fail-
ure of the French colonies. However, the success of Spain under a
similar system would seem to indicate that this was not the case.
A brief consideration of the colonizing work of the French in other
continents will bring out more clearly the true causes of the fail-
ure of that nation in this particular field of advancement.
About the time the French were colonizing America, they
began the foundation of their first settlement in the East Indies.
(1). Caillet
, pp. 343-5.
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The island of St. Christopher was the first to be discovered and
occupied in 1625. Then Richelieu authorized on October 31, 1626,
another company to take up work in this new field. The articles
of agreement were like those contained in former grants. However,
one must note that the Cardinal invested some of his own personal
money in this enterprise. The history of this settlement on the
island of St. Christopher is of no special interest, with one
exception, namely, the rivalry of the French and the Dutch as it
<1)
existed in this colony. The latter had begun to carry on a trade
with the French possessions at that place, which injured the com-
merce which the colony was supposed to carry on with the mother
country alone. As a result, in 1634, the government of France
passed a law requiring this settlement to trade with the company
which established it. This ended the matter as the colonists
obeyed it.
In 1635 another organization was created for the purpose
of settling in the West Indies, which in turn did not amount to
much. In fact at the time of Richelieu's death one finds that
very little had been accomplished, yet a start was made and that
was something. Thus during the year 1635 one findn that settle-
ments were made on the islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and
Saint Dominique ( 2 ). . Various privileges were offered these colo-
nies, but in spite of all the rights granted to them, they had
(1) . Gail let , pp. 349-50
(2) . ( Hi stoire genera le des Antille s par M. Adrien Dessalies)
Calllet
,
pp. 351-2.
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only mediocre success. The main cause of this was the same as that
of the other settlements, being the egoism and cupidity of the as-
sociates, who exploited the settlements for private profit and did
nothing for their direct benefit.
It was also under the administration of Richelieu and by
means of his guiding hand that the first settlement was made in
Guiana. This was undertaken in 1626, and by 16^0 various attempts
•/ere being made to spread and favor colonies near by(l). However,
nothing further was accomplished there until much later , after the
death of the Cardinal.
Settlements were established even in Africa. Senegal
especially attracted the attention of the French. In 1621-26, a
colony was formed which was under the protection of the Cardinal
and which had as its purpose the colonization of the land in that
territory ( 2) . To carry this out, Richelieu even sent Admiral de
Razilly with a squadron to aid in the work, but it was of no avail,
for the company had to be replaced in 1633 by a new one, composed
of the merchants of Eovren and Dieppe, who obtained permissinn to
trade for ten years at Cape Verde and upon the rivers in Senegal.
Various other similar organizat inns were formed, but nothing of
especial importance can be obtained from a study of French col-
nization in Africa at this time, except that a foundation for
(l). (Bellin, Description geographic de la Guiane
,
Paris, 1763,
in-4°. Ferraux, Compans, notice historique sur la Guyane fran -
chise
,
1843, in - 8°) CaiTXet
, pp. 351-2.
{ 2) . (Leon Guerin, Historie maritine de la France , t. 1, p. 400
Lc P. Labot, Nouvelle relations de l'Afr ique
,
Paris, 1728, t. 1,
p. 12) Calllet, po. 353-4.
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French influence in that continent was laid, which might have
amounted to more than it did in the past and only recently has
been largely built upon. However, one colony settled at this time
seems to have been more or less permanent, and that was the one
established on the island of Madagascar. liany attempts had been
made during the reign of Henry IV and during the first years of
the rule of Louis XIII to found settlements on this and neighboring
islands. Indeed there was another purpose involved in the estab-
lishment of a colony here besides mere colonization. The French
intended to establish a trade with the East Indies, using this po-
ssession as a base, and this made them all the more persistent in
their attempts to possess the island. On March 2, 1611, Louis XIII
granted permits to several men which gave to them the exclusive
right to settle these lands and begin trade. They had, besides, a
monopoly o.< all commerce carried on with the East Indies for the
no
next twelve years. But as they made/use of that privilege, the
merchants of Rouen resolved to try to take it from them. They of-
fered to carry on that trade and develop it to its fullest extent,
as they had the facilities to do so if they had the chance (1).
However, the first company oppoeed any interference with their
rights and claimed that thetjwere doing the best they could, con-
sidering the obstacles, which were opposed by the foreign neighbors
of France. As a result of it all, the various companies and claim-
ants to their rights were united by the government into one concern,
j
(1). (Dufreni de Franc hev i 1 Le , Hist, de la comjggne des Indies,
p. 15 ) Cai llet
, pp. 355- .
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The interesting thing about this is the fact that it illustrates
the direct control of the government over the various companies.
Whether it was for the best is a matter about which all are not
agreed. The cMef argument against this centralized form of colo-
nial government is the assertion that this system curbs indivi-
dual initiative among the settlers and among the various communi-
ties. They leave everything for the government to carry out, and
indeed they must do so for they are given no chance to exercise
very many important duties. On the other hand, the supporters
or Richelieu's colonial policy maintain that it was not because of
the centralized government that the French colonies failed to be-
come a success. The inherent weakness of the French along colonial
lines/^he many political difficulties which involved France in
rather unsatisfactory foreign relations, were two of the important
causes for the failure of the French colonization projects at that
time.
The grants establishing this united organization stated
that its members should undertake the navigation of the East Indies,
maintain its protection, and enjoy its privileges. The fleet of
Montmorency was to defend all the subjects of the king, as well as
the interests of the company, and to undertake any necessary trips
from the coast to the Cape of Good Hope during the sp^ace of twelve
years, in order to aid commerce. However, in spite of this liberal
charter and the various attempts made to settle the East Indies,
the plan failed in 1620 because of the pressure of the Dutch in that
part of the world.
Finally, the company decided to place a colony an the
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island of Madagascar, in the hope that if they could found a power-
ful settlement there, it would serve to aid them in further expe-
ditions to the Indies. So they went back to the original plan
which had been changed when the different colonizing organizations
had been united. However, the civil war in Prance, which took
place in 1631, prevented them from carrying out this plan.
In 1638 another attempt was made by a man from Rouen to
found a colony in Madagascar, and he left a very interesting accounpj,
of a voyage to that island(l). Finally, a new company was formed
January 24, 1642, which obtained from the Cardinal the exclusive
privilege of sending into the island of Madagascar and other adja-
cent islands the members of the organization, to establish colonies
and take possession in the name of the king(2). As a result in the
month of May a ship was sent to the islands, and they took formal
possession. Thus Madagascar was at last a real possession of France
and a way was prepared for further settlement. 'This was the last
colonizing project started by Richelieu, The question
naturally arises as to what was the general result of all the ef-
forts of Richelieu and others along this line. V/as it wortxh the
trouble?
"Geographical knowledge was extended if nothing else,"
says M. Caiilet(3) in relating the results of the colonial efforts
of France during this period. "Richelieu himself, " he says,
"aided a man named Samson to found a geographical school at that
touchant
,
(1) . (Discours/l'etablisSraent d'un compagnee francaise pour ie
commerce de Indies orientales), Caii let
, pp. 355-57.'
(2) . (Histoire de grande Isle de Madagascar, composee pour le
sieur de liacont, director gene'rale de la compagne Francais ),
Cai ilet
, pp. 357-8.
T3J. Caiilet, p. 358.
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time". But there were other gains more important than these, es-
pecially on the economic side.
r
,
rhen one looks over the field of colonial activities
undertaken during Richelieu's time he must conclude that very little
had been accomplished on the material side. It seems as if ail the
efforts of the Cardinal were in vain, and while Holland, England,
and Spain were forging ahead in their colonial development and
commercial activities, France was doing scarcely anything along
these lines. Yet on the other hand she had really done something
worth while, for she had at least made a start which was not too
late and would have amounted to much more than it did if the Cardi-
nal had lived to carry out his plans to their final conclusion.
He deserves great credit for the part he played in the colonial
development. In spite of the many internal troubles, such as the
relations of the government and the nobles, and his complicated
foreign policies, he was always interested in planting new French
settlements in great unoccupied continents, and he not only aided
in the different colonization enterprises during the first part of
his rule but also up to the very last.
Finally, one must not forget that this great nan died
before he could carry out his ideas as regards this part of his
administration. His Testament Politique clearly indicates the fact
that he realized the advantage of colonial development as keenly as
| French statesmen dc at the present day. Furthermore, he knew that
there was at hand a period in which England, Holland, and France
were to be rivals for commercial and colonial supremacy. Surely
he shows sound economic thinking in so far as he realizes the gen-
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eral value of new French settlements, and great per^istance in
the way in which he set about the accomplishment of his ideas.
However, a good many writers criticize Richelieu's
colonial policy. Masson thought that it was entirely too cen-
tralized, and D'Avenel, referring to one of his edicts concerning
the formation of a colonial company says "that it is a source of
profound astonishment to me to see a mind as clean and practical
as Richelieu's in diplomatic and military organization attempt
to carry out his dreams of that most peculiar economic despotism
which modern people call state socialism. 'The edict of Mor-
bihan is one which all France seeks,' says the Cardinal ,' whose
execution is alone capable of putting the kingdom in a state of
splendour. The proclamation,' he continues, 'alarms already the
English and the Dutch, who fear that the king will make himself
the master of the sea. Spain is afraid of us also, for she fears
the loss of her Indian possessions' "(1). This would indicate
that Richelieu realized the competition which would arise between
England, Holland, and France for new lands and command of the sea,
and also the value which new possessions would add to the mother
country. Eut M. D'Avenel draws from the above quotation the con-
clusion that Richelieu seems to have forgotten that colonization
was due to individual initiative rather than to royal plans. In
other words, it is not the general economic policy of the Cardinal
relating to this branch of his administration which is at fault,
but the method he used of carrying them into execution by means
of granting monopolies to certain companies, responsible only
(1). D'Svenel, Richelieu et la monarche absolue, V. 3, pp. 208-li
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to the central power of France. "His colonial policy," says one
writer, "was marred by the practice, common to all statesmen of
,that day, of intrusting colonial enterprise entirely to exclusive
companies. These corporations, by which privileged individuals
were protected at the expense of the general body of consumers,
were extremely unsuccessful in Franch hands, partly through their
excessive dependence upon state parentage and control, and partly
through their total neglect of agriculture, and the consequent
failure to form permanent and prosperous French settlements " ( 1 )
.
However, a study of the Spanish and English colonial policies will
same type
convince one that they were more or less of the / ana that mono-
polies were granted to various individuals or companies in a manner
similar to the French method(2). It must, however, be admitted
that this manner of establishing settlements was a hindrance to
all colonies, but the provisions of charters in the case of England
were not carried out because of English internal troubles which
took the attention of the home government from the settlements and
let them shift for themselves.
The same thing would probably have happened to the French
colonies if the mother country during these years had had her hands
full in meeting her European troubles without giving attention to
her new settlements. But there were other causes which brought
about the failure of the colonies, and these were not due to any
fault of Richelieu's. They may be stated as follows:
In the first place, the French warrior was not well
(1) . Lodge
,
Richelieu, p. 173.
(2) . Bourne
,
Spain in America, pp. 202-43. Cunningham
,
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adapted or fitted for commercial activities and as the first colo-
nies combined war, commerce, and sea-service, they failed because
of the lack of men capable of carrying on all these different
activities (1).
In the second place, numerous internal troubles, finan-
cial and industrial for instance, as well as Richelieu's involved
foreign policies, prevented the proper amount of attention being
given to colonization. The French did not stand around and let
the other countries settle the new lands, as H. D'Avenel says, but
the Cardinal's thoughts were always the same as regards this field
of activity. T/henever there was a lull in political and internal
affairs, or when he was offered any favorable opportunity, he did
his best to found successful colonies in the new lands.
M. Seel®7, in one of his books, points out that the
failure of French colonization was due not only to the fact that
the colonists were subject to a multitude of strict regulations
from which they would have been free if they had remained in France
but also because France lost a large part of her population in
wars and the expulsion of the Huguerots, and came to be on the verge
of financial ruin, so that as a result she had not the means to
develop colonization( 2) . "One might say that France lost her
colonies in a series of unsuccessful wars, but like Spain she had
too many irons in the fire" (3). Thus one can readily see that
D* Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchic absolue, Y.3, pp. 208-17.
(2) . See le y, The Expansion of England, p. 79.
(3) . TbiT, p. 110.
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France failed because of the fact that she was always involved
in wars and divided between a policy of colonial expansion and
European conquest.
However, Richelieu should not be censured for his part
in the development cf French settlement. As was said before, his
general economic ideas as to the value of colonies was correct.
The persistent manner in which he went about carrying out his
ideas illustrates the fact that he realized the importance of this
side of his administration. Finally, the failure of the colonies
was due not to him but to the general weakness of the French
people and the faults of those who administered the government
after him. ichelieu had made a good start, which, if carried
out, would have made France possibly into a great empire, other
things being equal. If the Cardinal had even lived a few years
longer, things might have been different; but this is a matter of
conjecture. However, it is interesting to note that it is only
within the last century that France has been able to do anything
in regard to colonization. And thus, the general policies of
Richelieu have been revived at the present day and so are doubly
important as constituting a force which is living at the present
time. That Richelieu deserves more credit than he has obtained for
his work in behalf of Franch colonization, that whatever weaknesses
existed in his charters granted to colonists were of minor import-
ance, and finally, that the foundation laid by this man^Vt&ld have
j
was ruined by the inaptitude of the French people and the faults of
those who came after him, have been the main conclusions arrived at
from a study of this phase of the great man's career.
resulted in the erection of a strong and powerful imperial edifice,
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Chapter III.
The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu as
Regards Commerce.
"'.Then Richelieu came into power," says Mr. Bridges,
"his task was two fold: (1) The internal process of crushing the
French aristocracy and founding the French monarchy upon its ruin.
(2) The external work of humbling the retrograde powers of Aus-
tria and Spain, and of carrying out the policy, which found its
issue in the treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees (1)" These
were his political plans, but behind this phase of his adminis-
tration there existed an economic background which influenced him
more than most modern writers would indicate in their works con-
cerning his life. "To Richelieu as well as Cromwell and other
great people of his time," continues Mr. Bridges, "war and for-
eign conquest vras no longer the primary occupation of rulers.
TJher. they engaged in it they saw, dimly indeed, and inconsequent ly
,
but still they saw, the two grand tendencies of the modern world;
peaceful industry in the temporal sphere and morality based upon
the unfettered thoughts in the spiritual" ( 2) . Thus one finds that
when Richelieu came into power, the value of commerce and industry
was just beginning to be appreciated, and because of this a study
of the ideas and actual accomplishments of the Cardinal in respect
to trade in general will be of especial interest.
Richelieu in his ^'Political Testament" constantly refers
to the value of commerce, and is fond of citing Holland as an ex-
(1) . Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert
, p. 43.
(2) Ibid, p. ""33":
r
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ample of a country built to a high state of efficiency by means of
commerce(l). "It is a common saying," he says, "but true as well,
that as nations often increase their territory by means of war,
thet^ enrich themselves ordinarily in times of peace by means of
commerce. The wealth of Holland, which country properly speaking
has only a handful of people, limited to a small bit of earth,
which is mostly water or low marshy lands, is an example and a
proof of the utility of commerce. Indeed that nation not only
supplies itself with butter and cheese, but furnishes nearly all
the countries of Europe with the greater part of what they use.
Navigation has made her very celebrated and powerful all over the
world, so that after having made herself mistress of commerce in
the East Indies to the disadvantage of the Portuguese, who had been
established there for some time, she has been able to give some
attention to Spanish colonies in the TJest Indies "
This quotation indicates that I ichelieu realized the
importance of commerce more clearly than did the majority of
statesmen at that time. It is really an economic exposition con-
cerning the value of trade, in itself. And the author not only
supports this idea which he is trying to bring out by citing Hol-
land as an example, but points out various other countries and
cities which have gained very much through the pursuit of commerce
(2). In particular he mentions Genoa as an illustration of a city
grown strong through trade
.
The Cardinal next turns to France 'Who," he says, "in
order to be self-sufficing has up to the present time neglected
(1) . Richelieu's Testament Politique , Vol. 2, pp. 64.
(2) . Ibid, pp. 65.
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commerce, which inde-d she can carry on as well as her neighbors."
In fact he believed she would gain more than they in the pursuit
of trade. He points out the opportunities in the fishing indus-
try and finally asserts that France has a great number of sailors
who at present seek employment under foreign flags. In other
words, he infers that France, having the opportunity, the pro-
ducts, and the men, ou&ht to take her place as a strong commercial,
nation. In regard to supplying work for the French marines, he
has the following to say, "we must have employment for them in
order to keep our sailors busy instead of allowing them to aid
foreign countries because of our neglect. \7e can take from Spain
and the other lands that which they have gained up to the present
by means of our men who serve them"(l). In other words, Rich-
elieu recognizes the economic principle that to keep all the
available labor supplied with work would strengthen the nation.
He knows that every man is of economic importance to France, al-
though, of course, he did not formulate this according to the
modern point of view.
As to the economic wealth of France and its influence
on commerce, Richelieu made the following statement ," It is fer-
tile," he says, "in grains, wines etc., which Spain, England and
other lands have need of. T.7hen we comprehend the resources and
advantages which hature has provided us with, we will then ob-
tain and be able to make money from those who wish our merchan-
dise^ because they are absolutely in need of our surplus products,
and because this excess of produced wealth is of little use to us,
The cloti of Spain, England, and Holland are luxuries and are not
(1). Richelieu, Testament Politique, V . 2, pp. 65. |
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necessary for us." France is constantly foremost in his thoughts.
How can he benefit her? By what economic means can he make her a
powerful, self-supporting nation? It is a rather selfish com-
mercial policy, but one which all men of his position have fol-
lowed and will follow more or less closely. They all desire to
make their own countries strong, and the Cardinal is no exception.
Indeed his ideas at this time have a tinge of the extreme mercan-
tile doctrine as illustrated in his desire to have the exports of
France greater than the imports
.
Richelieu also possessed that economic idea which main-
tains that a person or a nation is not benefited or does not aid
others by a large consumption of those things which are luxuries.
This saving turn of mind was a trait which predominated through-
out his entire life, and indeed is characteristic of the true"
economic thinker. He wanted France to avoid all luxuries and
depend on her own goods to supply her wants. She could get her
raw wool from Spain, manufacture it herself and then buy more
wool with the proceeds. In other words, he believed that France
could best manufacture the raw wool of. other nations. This is
a good example of his desire to aid manufactures, and would
seem to indicate that he was tending toward that economic princi-
ple which would have each nation specialize in the line it is
best fitted for. The care with which he took stock of the resour-
ces of France tends to increase the probability that he did wish
to follow out that idea.
At any rate, one can be sure that he desired the French
people to patronize home industries. Thus he seems to fit into
(1). Richelieu, Tjegjbament Politique
t
V. 2, pp. 66-67.
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the protectionist camp better than that of the free traders. "If
the king is satisfied with the cloth of Beam, why cannot the peo-
ple use it also?(i)" . In other words, the Cardinal wants them to
patronize home industries as being just as good if not better than
others in the quality of goods turned out. In fact he claims that
the east likes the cloth of France. If they do, why shouldn't his
fellow countrymen use it? "France is industrious enough'^ he says,
"to dispense with some of the best manufactures of her neighbors
if she desires. They make at Tours plush so beautiful that it is
sent to Italy and other countries "( 2 ) . He then goes on to argue
in favor of home made against foreign made cloth. "Thus it will
pay us to dispense with commerce^ he says, "which can only serve
to increase our laziness or sloth and increase out taste for luxury,
in order to take up that which can increase our wealth, keep our
mariners busy, and thus keep them at home". One can well wonder
if he had not Spain in mind when he wrote the above quotation. At
any rate his constant fear of France's becoming weak through her
taste for luxury would serve to indicate that he was moved by the
examples of the decline of other nations because of this. The
above passage would also tend to aid in establishing the fact that
the Cardinal did ^wish to develop manufactures.
Now Richelieu realized that in order to have and devel-
op the various industries, one must establish an extensive commerce
(1) . Richelieu, Testament Politique
, pp. 67-68.
(2) . Ibid, pp. 68-69.
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So he goes on in his"Political Testament' 1 to relate the gains which
would occur to France if she paid more attention to this side of
her development. He mentions the advantages which would occur to
France if she undertook commerce with Canada and Africa. She could
get furs from the former and gold from the latter in exchange for
her products. "If the subjects of the king had plenty of ships,"
he says, "they would be able to carry on all the traffic with the
north which the
/Flemish and Dutch had control of at that time. Because all of
the north had an absolute need of wine, vinegar, spirits, prunes,
etc., all commodities in which the kingdom abounded and of which
it had a surplus. It would be easy to carry on commerce in that
they could bring back wood, copper, and things not only useful to
i us but to our neighbors also, who must get it directly from us" (1).
Thus he wants France to trade with the north as well as the east,
in order to get control of the products of those countries and
in turn sell them to other lands. An idea of monopoly tnen enters
into his plans. The value of getting complete control of certain
commodities is quite clear to the Cardinal, and he sees wherein
Prance will gain by means of this commercial practice.
He next proceeds to mention the advantages of trade with
the East, with Persia, China, and the East Indies. However, in
regard to the latter (2), he realizes that little can be cone until
the power of Spain is broken by means of a successful war. Trade
with the Mediterranean, however, received due consideration. In
regard to the city of Aleppo he notes that they get from France a
great quantity of money and merchandise, and send back silks, rugs,
(1) . Richelieu, Testament Politique, Vol. 2, pp. 68-70.
(2) . Ibid, p. 7T:
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cotton goods, etc. "Before the English and Dutch settled in the
Indies, France," he says, "was the center of all the distribution
of eastern merchandise in the west. Now the very same English
and Dutch have deprived us of this commerce It is neces-
sary that we get back this trade (1)" The Cardinal real-
ized that France was losing in the fight for commercial control
and must do something to advance its position(2).
He also realized that he had been mistaken in regard to
his past views concerning the value of commerce and the free ex-
change of goods. "I admit," he says, "that I have for a long time
been deceived as to the commerce which the people of Provence
founded in the East. I believed, as many others did, that it was
pre judical to the state. This idea was teased on the common opin-
ion that it wasted the money of the kingdom to bring back mer-
chandise not necessary at all and only useful for the ease of our
nation. But after having made a more careful study of the sub-
ject of trade, which was condemned by the voice of the public, I
have changed my mind, which, if any one will examine the question
carefully j was done after very deep thought. It is certain that
we could not get along without most of the merchandise which is
obtained from the east, such as silks, cottons, oils, rhubarb,
and many other drugs and spices which are necessary to us (3)."
This is undoubtedly one of the most important of
Richelieu's economic utterances. It shows that while he might
have followed the narrow mercantile doctrine in regard to the
his
evil of commerce^ in/early life, yet before his death, he realized
3) Richelieu's Testament Politique, pp. 75-76.
1). Eichelieu's Testament Polit ique, V. 2, pp. 73-75.
(2). Venice during^The age of ; icheTieu was on the decline, so
was, not, a rival of Franc e . '
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that trade founded on the free exchange of goods was economi-
cally sound. But to go back to his relations with eastern trade
He goes on to say that so far as money was concerned
France came out ahead in her coinr.erce with the Levant He
then points out the fact that France was a natural center of
distribution of goods from the Fast. "Some advantage must be
obtained from the commerce on the seas," he says, " the French
will never undertake anything with eagerness unless they are
made to see that it is useful and that the means are as easy
as the ends"(l). One of the: best expedients that could be
adopted, he goes on to say, would be for the government to sell
old vessels to the people of France at a fair price on condition
that they be used for' trade and not be sold outside the kingdom.
The advantage of this would not only be on the commercial but
on the military side as well, it would furnish a secondary means
of defense in case of need. In addition, more ships can easily
be built to replace the ones sold, as 3 ranee is well supplied
with the materials for building them.
Furthermore, as another aid to commerce, he recommends
that his majesty give ranks or stations to the merchants instead
of giving them to persons who are good for nothing and to whom
the honor is simply an event which increases their idleness and
flatters their wives. This recognition of commerce, he believes^,
will reestablish trade up >n such a firm basis that the public
and the individual will derive from it a great advantage. Fi-
nally he advises those who follow him to watch the pirates and
keep them thoroughly suppressed. This would greatly aid cenmerce.
(1). Richelieu's Testament Politique
,
v. 2, pp. 75-76.
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Trade occupied an important place in Richelieu's thoughts
at this time, and as these quotations are extracts from one of his
last writings it gives us the final beliefs of this great man on
the subject. That he had different views before this, he adr.it s,
and thus it must be conceded that he didn't accomplish as much as if
he had been able to follow out these later thoughts from the very
start of his administration. On the other ..and, the fact that he
believed this before he died must have been an important factor in
directing the activities of those who were to follow along
lines of economic endeavor which tended to turn away from the old
narrow mercantile doctrine. But before carrying this
discussion further it see ms best to look into the actual accomplish'
ments of this great man and the problems he encountered in his
efforts to build up commerce. The trade of France in the East and
conditions there during that period will be taken up first.
Commerce in the east was greatly hindered not only by the
new settlements made by. Holland and England, but also because of
the depredations committed by the pirates of North Africa who ever-
ran the entire Mediterranean and captured many French vessels, ta-
king their crews to serve as slaves. "Piracy," says M. Masson,
"was very bad before Richelieu's time, and directly after his death
and
It diminished in power/effect during the administration of the Car-
dinal, who did all he could by means of treaties and a strong fleet
to put down these fierce people from Africa."(l).
in addition to the trouble caused by the ravages of the
pirates, France was at "swords^* points" with the Turks most of the
(l). Ilasson
,
p. 35, p. 45, and pp. 48-53.
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time, so that affairs on the Mediterranean were very interesting
during Richelieu's rule. Indeed the trouble with the Ottomans
almost resembled a war in 1660 as a culmination of all past events
This would have been a very bad thing for both parties. But what
were the causes of this unfortunate state of affairs?
The chief one was the fact that the ambassadors of Franc
lacked credit and the power to aid commerce effectively. This si-
tuation was not remedied, although richelieu in a letter to an am-
bassador to the East advised him to do two things, first to ar-
range with the Sultan a suitable treaty whereby the christian
religion would be observed, and to conclude with the East suitable
trade relations, which would be of great importance to both par-
ties concerned(l) . At this point he adds the following note, that
all subjects of other powers and rulers, who have no ambassador
at Constantinople, could trade under the said banner of France, if
they followed the terms of her treaties and observed the French
consul's orders. It seems that the Cardinal at this time was
afraid of the British and Venetian influence in the East, and, as
a result, was anxious to do everything he could to keep up favor-
able relations with the Turks. But he was unable to do so very
successfully as there were other causes which prevented relations
of friendship with the East.
The fact that the individual cities had charge of com-
merce accounted for a great part of the trouble in the trade with
the Levant and also the extreme oppression of the pirates. IThen
Richelieu came into power, and especially when he received the
office of superintendent of navigation and commerce, he made the
(I). Hanson
, p. 322.
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centralized system more effective in that he tried to do away with
the local powers and the corruption which resulted from their ef-
forts in this field of administration. He was able to do so to
a certain extent in so far as concerns commerce in the East, and
his system of government vas indeed of much benefit because it did
not suppress the local powers (1).
The extreme mercantile doctrine was another factor in
injuring trade relations between France and the East. The idea
that the exportation of money was detrimental to the prosperity
of the kingdom caused the western followers of that belief to neg-
lect many of the benefits of the trade of the Levant in order not
to have to send gold and silver from home, and in order to bring
those precious metals into their own lands. As a result of these
different unfortunate ideas and circumstances, the French Levan-
tir.e commerce was in a very bad situation. "Indeed up to Riche-
lieu's time,'' says Masson, "trade relations were in great con-
fusion; the central government and the local city authorities were
constantly interferring with each other and thus nothing was ac-
compti'shed . " But when the Cardinal came into power things were
changed. "To discover a real mind says Pugeonneau, a
political reasoner and a master of it, "one must pass by these me-
diocre attempts and this time of anarchy and examine the rule of
Fichelieu. Instead of confining economic questions to a secon-
dary place, he has studied them with passion. Indeed he has con-
cerning commerce, the sea, and colonies not the vague views with
which political thinkers of the second order are content, but has
(1). I lasson
,
pp. 106-7.
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definite ideas, and these he has formulated in his Politi cal Tes-
tament, a work genuine in thought and style(l)" In other words,
Mas son regarded Richelieu as having a very beneficial influence
upon eastern commerce. He points out the fact that the Cardinal
had clearer ideas on this subject than did those who worked with
him in this part of his administration. Indeed most of the other
men confronted with the Eastern situation believed in the specie
theory
;
that the exportation of gold was harmful to the nation.
But Richelieu did not share the belief, and Masson soems to think
that the Cardinal opposed this idea for some time before his death.
There were other men who exerted some influence on the
eastern trade situation. One of them was Father Joseph who, by
means of the missions he established there, aided not only the
Church but also French commerce in the Levant.
Richelieu during his administration was greatly interested
in the matter of trade with Persia (2). Hearing that this country
was trying to arrange a commercial treaty with Russia, in order to
send goods that way, he sent agents in 1627 to conclude similar
agreements. These representatives were aided by other people in
Persia who advised that country to trade with France and keep away
from the English who were trying to bring about favorable commer-
cial relations with the Ottomans. As a result the trade agreement
between Persia and England was broken up, and the commerce of France
with Persia saved from ruin for the time being. But this was not
all that the Cardinal tried to do.
(1) . "asson
,
p. 109.
(2) . Ibid, pp. 118-119.

55
In a vain attempt to stay the decline of commerce in the
East, he tried to open up routes for the commerce of France through
Egupt. He was especially interested in trade conditions in Africa,
but death prevented him from carrying out projects in that conti-
nent. These intentions were , however, taken up and completed during
the reign of Louis XIV. A memoir of that period contains the Car-
dinal's proposal to restore the commerce of the Indies to the Medi-
terranean ports by means of a canal just about where the Suez Canal
is now '!). This, it was hoped, would revive industry in the East.
However, try as he might, commerce With the Levant continued to fall
rapidly, as had been the case since the death of Henry IV.
At this time, when France was trying to retain her place
in the East so far as commerce was concerned, the English and the
Dutch began to build up their trade with the East and thus assumed
places as active competitors of France. They won their way into
the good graces of the Sultan, while the French lost in his respect.
This, coupled with the fact that the French sold inferior goods,
greatly injured their eastern commerce. "Also," says H. Has son,
*it was the solidarity of their organization, so different from the
Trench state of anarchy, which gave them the advantage "( 2)
.
But in spite of the rapid progress of the foreigners,
! beginning with the year 1620, the French still carried on an impor-
j
tant trade with the East and it continued up to 1635. Then the war
with Spain accentuated its ruin^riese causes, together with the
(1) . Has son
, pp. 134-135.
(2) . Ibid, pp. 118-119.
•
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hindrance encountered from the war vessels of the English, the
Dutch, and the pirates, the general wars, the heavy taxes, and
the break down in manufactures, diminished greatly the French
trade in the Levant from 1635 to 1648. "In addition to this,"
says M. Masson, "our fleet decreased rapidly during this period
so that it was almost a thing of the past when Colbert began his
administration." (it might be added that the chief decline in
Eastern trade and an u armed marine took place after 1642, and thus
after the death of Richelieu.)
All this could have been averted. M. Masson says that
even though Holland and England did try to turn a great amount
of commerce from the 1ndies; yet there was a place for the trade
of the Mediterranean if France could have taken advantage of it(l).
Indeed it was a great mistake to let the English and the Dutch
penetrate into the mediterranean where they would ever be masters.
Finally, one must conclude that the administration of
Fichelieu, in spite of his ardent desire to aid commerce and in
spite of the interesting projects which his fertile originality
invented, really accomplished very little of importance in the
East so far as trade was concerned( 2) . About the only thing he
did of very great importance was to put down piracy for the time
being. The slowness and the entire lack of activity displayed by
the officials under him, the fact that they were susceptible to
corruption, which caused them to get into trouble in the Levant,
all tended to ruin trade in the East, so that Richelieu, occupied
with western foreign relations and other matters, was not able
to do as much as he would have liked, though he realized just
(1). Hasson
, pp. 134-135 (2). See Caillet
, pp. 326-27.
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what was the difficulty and what remedies were needed. However,
one must admit that the Cardinal displayed a remarkable keenness
of economic thought in his relation with Eastern commerce. He
realized the advantage of trade between France and the Levant, by
which they should exchange their products. Thus the inferences
drawn above (1), that Richelieu was moved by the modern economic
ideas of free exchange of products, and that he thought every
nation should raise and manufacture those things for which the
natural resources of the country were most useful, and finally that
he believed and saw through the fallacy of the extreme mercantile
doctrine quite a while before his death, seem to be borne out in
his dealings with the Levant.
From the East, which has been considered more in detail
than its present importance would warrant, it seems best now to
turn to a brief consideration of the relations betv/een England and
France during the time of F.ichelieu. The former country was just
beginning the great colonial projects which were to make her so
powerful all over the world. She was building up a large navy at
this time, and thus was rapidly beginning a great sea-power. On
this account, the economic relations betv/een the two countries
were not very close during the Cardinal's administration in spite
of the fact that various political events caused more or less shift-
ing of political friendliness. For instance during the Thirty
Years' War, England and France were allies, but in matters concerning
commerce in the East, they were bitter rivals. Numerous letters of
Richelieu relate the injury committed upon French commerce by
English pirates, and throughout the entire colonial world, France
(I). See supra, pp. 49-50.

58
and England are seen beginning that opposition and rivalry for
territorial supremacy which was to culminate in a great struggle
in the next century. However, so far as actual war in concerned,
Richelieu after the peace of 1629 was not at all anxious to become
involved in any dispute with Great Britain which might lead to
hostilities. He had Spain on his hands and thus we find that
during his entire rule he tried to maintain terms of peace with
England. But the commercial rivalry which was springing up at
that time caused the two countries to be more or less distant
toward each other during the entire period.
However, various letters of the Cardinal have been pub-
lished whose contents are filled with matters relating to the
proposed treaty of peace which he was trying to arrange. Other
Letters are found which deal with reprisals, and plans to prevent
the depredations committed on French commerce. One of the most
interesting of his letters contains a project for a series of
commercial laws (1). Another points out clearly the fact that he
wanted peace to exist between the two countries, which was to be
carried out all over the world wherever their interests met.
This communication consists of instructions sent in 16.30 to
Baillee A.M. De Fontenay-Mareuii
,
upon his going to England as an
ambassador from France. "The said Marquis de Fontenoy will re-
collect," he says, "that his majesty sent the Gieur de Chasteane-
uf to England to try to carry out four things: (1) To receive the
oath which the said king must take to observe the treaty of peace.
(2) To make a good law for commerce by which a perfect union could
be arranged between the subjects of the two lands and all differ-
(1). Richelieu's Letters, Vol. 7, pp. 96-97,
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ences could be adjusted betwee them •The first point has
been accomplished, but as to the matter of commerce, the Sieur de
Chasteaneauf has interviewed the consul of England many times in
regard to it .... but the question, being very complicated, has
not been settled as yet. Like Cieur de Chasteaneauf, he should
follow the same directions and try to obtain the restitution of
Canada, and the merchandise and vessels taken from the French
since the peace was arranged Let the laws of the sea judge
such events as the return of vessels and lastly, reason and justice
must rule in their relations in the future"(l). This letter clear-
ly shows that the Cardinal desired peace between the two countries
and also wanted commercial relations subject to definite rules es-
tablished between the two countries. His ideas seem almost modern
in this respect.
veals his ideas in regard to commercial relations with Great Bri-
tain. One of them refers to the fact that the English have a cus-
tom of stopping ail French vessels bound for Spain and examining
their cargoes to see what merchandise they are carrying. "This
practice,'' says Richelieu, "ought to be stopped at once"(2). It
might be ail right for England to capture French ships in time of
war, but this was not the case during intervals of peace. If
Great Britain refused to desist from this unfair custom, then ail
commercial relations should be broken between the two. This shows
be
that the Cardinal did not intend to/imposed upon by England in any
way including commercial relations. However, his desire to be a
political ally to Great Britain in borne out in another letter in
(1). Richelieu's Letters, Vol. 3, pp. 518-19
Other letters may be found in which Richelieu further re
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which one discovers the interesting fact that he wanted France to
stand behind England in her efforts to win the Palatinate and
that a good treaty of commerce should be arranged between the two
nations(l). Thus the Cardinal in support of his desire points
out that while Great Britain was willing to violate her neutrality
and stop French vessels on the way to Spain, yet she was willing
to carry contraband goods to that nation herself. Evidently there
existed at this time a commercial struggle between France and
England, both on the theoretical and practical side. This became
worse as time went on. But no actual warfare resulted, and Rich-
elieu stood for peace with that nation. and a commercial policy
that was wise and just. But political events prevented his idea
from being carried out. It would seem to be the case that the
economic questions influenced Richelieu to a greater extent than
previous works or writings on his life have brought out. He re-
alized that both nations were rivals over trade as well as coloni-
zation, and in order to prevent their disputes over commerce from
coming to a head, he tried to arrange treaties which would settle
and prevent any further disputes on that score. This is a modern'
practice which the more civilized countries try to carry out.
Another nation which the French encountered in their
commercial and colonial operations was Holland. That country was
reaching her prime in Richelieu's days. He realized this, and whii
he knew that the Dutch were the opponents of France so far as
colonization was concerned, yet he tried to arrange good commercial
relations with them as against Spain in their political disputes,
and as a result attained very friendly relations.
(1). Richelieu's Letters, p. 671, Vol. 3.
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Indeed he states in a letter that all countries, including Holland,;
can dispose of their merchandise in France, with the exception of
England(X). Richelieu favored Holland as against Spain and also
to protect France. '"There is not a sensible man but knows," he
says, "that the aid which the king gives to Holland is the means
by which the kingdom is kept most powerful" (2)
.
Evidently the Cardinal did not fear Holland politically.
Indeed the main source of opposition to that nation was in the
East, where commercial rivalry prevailed between it and France.
Thus while they were friends politically, the economic phase of
national difficulties was arising and would lead to more definite
results in the course of time. Richelieu was aware of this great
power of Holland, v/hich affected his nation especially upon the
sea. In one of his letters he says that it is necessary for the
king to plan either to concede everything to the English and Dutch,
who are powerful at nea , or that his majesty must make himrelf so
powerful in a short time that they can undertake nothing against
him(3). In other words, the Cardinal believed that it would be
a better plan to have a navy large enough to meet all enemies
without being forced to borrow ships from other nations as France
had been obliged to do during the siege of La Rochelle.
In regard to the relation of France and Spain during this
period, little need be said. They were bitter enemies both poli-
tically and commercially. The Cardinal realized that the political
and commercial safety of France lay only in the decay of the power
(1) . Richelieu's Letter s, Vol. 2, p. 774.
(2) . Hanotaux Maximes d'gtat et Fragments Politique, p. 737.
(o). Kichelieu rs Letters
, Vol. 2, p. 561.
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of Spain, so that he was a deadly enemy of that nation during his
entire administration. He opposed that nation for the most part
in Italy, where the conflict was based on political disputes. It
was in the East and in other colonial possessions that we find the
commercial question arising. *n the Levant, for example, Rich-
elieu opposed the extension of Spanish trade into that territory
(1). Other letters of his demonstrate the fact that the inter-
ference of Spain with French trade on the high seas was one of the
main causes of his opposition to that country (2). Therefore, one
must conclude that commercial rivalry was one of the important
factors of the constant struggle between the two nations.
This rivalry in the East was not only one of the main
causes of his opposition to Spain, Holland, and England, but
also greatly influenced him in carrying out his plan of sending
an agent in 1629, to arrange treaties of commerce with Denmark,
Sweden, and Russia. By reading the report of Richelieu's envoy,
one can obtain a very clear insight into the purposes of these
treaties(3). In it he shows why he was sent out and what he did.
The reason for going he gives as follows: First, trouble between
Turkey and Persia, and second, pirates on the Mediterranean. The
French traders on this account wanted to get the permission of
Russia to allow the ca^aivans to go through their territory instead
of taking the old route, the cost of conveyance either way being
about the same. "It is a question, he says, of finding out from
the kings of Norway, Russia, and Sweden whether they would make an
impost greater than Turkey desired for letting the goods go across
(1) . Richelieu's Letters
, Vol. 2, pp. 23-4.
(2) . Ibid, Vol. 2, pp. 489-90
(3) . (Les voyages de monsieur Pes Hayes ) Caillet. pp. 328-32.
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their lands (1)
.
Accordingly, on the 18th of July, 1629, a treaty was
concluded between Denmark and France. It was a commercial agree-
the
ment and was very advantageous to/French, for in place of paying
5 to 6 per cent duty for goods passing the " Sund ", being brought
into the country and taken through to Norway, they paid only 4%
while all other foreigners paid the first amount. Furthermore,
they could get pure salt from those countries, when before they
had to use the impure product which the Hollanders sold to them.
They would have a better market for the purchase of such things
as masts for boats, hemp, etc., which were useful to France. Thus
she would gain by obtaining the products she needed from Denmark
and selling hers at low import rates. Furthermore, she would have
command of the Eastern spices, drugs, etc., for herself and for
the use of the northern nations at a low import rate because of
this treaty.
On the twelfth of November, 1629, a treaty was drawn up
with Russia. Information concerning this affair is obtained from
the French agent to the Tsar(2). One finds out from a study of it
that the negotiations succeeded only in part, for the Tzar refused
to authorize the foreigners to carry on the trade in silks from
Persia across Russia, promising only to procure the merchandise
from the East and Persia and bring it across Russia at a cheaper
rate. In other words, French merchants were to be allowed to trade
with the Russians but not across Russia with the Persians. Freedom
(i). (Les voyages de Monsieur des Hayes, baron de Courmesmin,
en Denmark, 1664, in -12, p. 99 et seq.) Caillet
, pp. 528-32.
( 2 >- ( The French Hercurie, Vol. XVI, p. 1022) in Caillet
, pp. 331-3.
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of trade was granted to them in that respect. But any cases of
disputes between the traders of both nations should be tried by
a Russian judge. As a result, even though they couldn't send their
caravans from the East through Russia, the Tsar promised to have
the goods from the Bast distributed to the French dealers very
cheaply, and indeed they were to be favored in all things in order
that trade should be fostered between the two countries. This was
the first treaty of commerce between France and Russia, and it is
important on that account if for nothing else. it would indicate
not only the commercial activities and aims of Richelieu, but also
the fact that other nations were beginning to look upon France as
a strong country, economically, whose commercial friendship would
be an asset to any nation.
Another treaty of inportance was that arranged between
France and Sweden(l). In it an alliance was agreed upon which
was to last six years, and in compliance with it they agreed to
defend oppressed friends, to assure freedom of commerce from the
north to the Baltic Sea, etc. The rest of this treaty is of no
especial interest.
hus one sees that France during this period tried to
arrange favorable treaties with all the northern nations who con-
trolled the Baltic Sea at that time, and with all lands interested
in Eastern trade or connected with it. Richelieu was the insti-
gator of this policy and thus deserves credit for what he accom-
plished along that line, and especially when one considers the
many political troubles v/hich attracted his attention at that time.
(1). Martin's Histoire de France , Vol. II, p. 316.
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Indeed it was the Cardinal who sent the traveller, Taverriisr, a
worthy successor to Marco Polo, to negotiate the treaties with the
Tsar and the king of Denmark, which gave to France the freedom of
commerce with Russia and the right to pass through the "Sund"(l).
This agent of Richelieu also signed in 1631 a treaty with Morocco
which stipulated the restitution of slaves and the right to establish
consuls in that land(2). The Bastions of France were given back
for the second time in 1640 and trade was aided to a great extent
thereby.
It is then evident that Richelieu carried out his idea of
making France strong not only in the political, but also in the
economic field. He seems to have realized that the ideal strong
nation was the one which had definite national boundaries, and which
had no fear of any lands on the political side. Therefore, he pro-
ceeded to oppose Spain in order to establish this so far as it con-
cerned France. Then he proceeded to arrange or attempt to arrange
favoratele commercial relations with other countries. In doing this
he was successful, and at his death he left France a strong nation
with an extensive commerce which would have made her the greatest
of all lands on the economic side if his ideas had been carried out.
That brings up the question as to what were the real results of
Richelieu's commercial policy and what v/as its importance so far as
it concerned the development of the commerce of France.
His work so far as it concerns commerce is important in
two entirely different ways or phases. First the value of his
ideas as regards trade and secondly the actual worth of his commer-
cial accomplishments. (The general ideas on trade as found in his
(1). Lavisse et Rambaud. Histoire Generale
. Vol. V, p. 370.
(SB) : Caillet . p j. 316-21 _
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Polit ical Testament might have had an important influence on the
policies of men like Colbert). Indeed those last theoretical doc-
trines of his, which his untimely death prevented him from carrying
out, would have proved an excellent guide for those who followed
him. The present inquiry will not seek to ascertain what
extent they did so. Possibly if Richelieu's ideas had been followed
to the letter, France wouldjbe a different nation.
Cn the other hand, the practical effect of Richelieu's
commercial policy was felt even during his period of rule. He
aided eastern trade by suppressing the pirates. Mis commercial
treaties with various countries gave France the chance of becoming
a nation which would be the center of the distribution of goods
between the East and the West. This had a beneficial effect on
commercial conditions in France at that time which was more or less
temporary, due to the changing political situation, in addition to
suppressing the pirates he aided commerce by means of rebuilding
the various -dilapidated ports which had been neglected since the
time of Louis XI.
Lastly, his theoretical ideas had a favorable effect on
the trade conditions during his time as well as in the future. For
instance, his "code Michau" prepared at the assembly of notables at
Paris in 1626, contains, among other acts useful to co;n;erce and
navigation, the prohibition of exporting any merchandise from co-
lonial France under a foreign flag, unless there should be no
French vessel in port. The act was indeed helpful at that lime be-
cause it encouraged the construction of a merchant marine, which
would have been able to render great services to the East if other

67
unforeseen events had not prevented it from doing so. Taking
everything into consideration, Richelieu had the right ideas in
fegard to commerce, and reaily accomplished more than one would
expect when his many other political activities are examined in
relation to their effect on this side of his administration, and
their importance at that time as compared with the little attention
1
given to economic questions. The Cardinal did pay attention to
commercial problems and as a result, one cannot very well close a
thesis on this side of the man s administration without a brief con-'
sideration of his relations to the mercantile doctrine, as derived
from what has been written so far concerning his exterior commercial
policies, and a final summing up of his importance from the economic
point of view.
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Chapter IV.
Conclusion .
Richelieu's Relation to the Mercantile Doctrine and his
Economic Importance .
In the first part of this thesis, a definition of the
mercantile doctrine was separated into two parts. One was the gen-
eral idda of building up the state economically, socially, and po-
litically. That is, it was the desire to make the state supreme
over all smaller and inferior corporations, institutions, and powers
To accomplish this, a strong navy, extensive schemes of colonization
and great internal growth in population, industry, etc., was en-
couraged and almost required. The nation tried to make itself just
as powerful and self-sufficing as possible. Richelieu believed in
this doctrine and tried to follow it in his administration in spite
of the many political affairs and internal troubles which tended to
weaken his efforts along this line. At any rate, he tried to build
up a strong navy, develop colonies, and make the state as strong as
possible be means of encouraging industries in France itself. In
other words, the Cardinal did all he could to make the nation strong
internally as well as externally. His financial policy was a little
weak, but this was due more to the unfortunate war than to any per-
sonal mistake made by him. On the other hand, he diminished the
power of the Huguenots and nobles as well, and after he had put them
in their proper position of subordination to the central power, he
did all he could to encourage them to devote themselves to agricul-
ture, industry, and commerce(l). This illustrates his efforts to
(1). ' Rambaud, Civilisation Franc ais
, p. 571.
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make France strong within. One writer says the following in re-
gard to his relations with the nobles: "Richelieu's razing of the
fortresses of the nobility was one of the most important steps
ever taken toward internal freedom of intercourse within France" ( )
,
The Cardinal's active measures as regards the creation
of a French marine were among the most important contributions tov/ard
the development of an independent commercial policy in relation
to other countries. In regard to colonization, one can easily see
that he did all he could to develop this part of his commercial pol-
icies. Also his work in trying to arrange favorable trade relations
with other countries aided greatly in carrying out this part of the
mercantile theory and thus making France a nation capable of taking
her place among the great powers of that age. Also, a study of
his political policies will reveal the fact that they were strongly
influenced by that doctrine, and were carried out in a manner cal-
culated to make France a strong nation, and the king the center of
her strength. This was done with the belief that the doctrine was
correct and that by obeying its precepts France could develop her
economic resources peacefully and without fear of the opposition
of any other nations. To sum the matter up, one must conclude that
Richelieu did follow out in a most enlightened way this part of the
mercantile doctrine which is in use even at the present time.
However, this was not so in the case of the extreme mer-
cantile doctrine, for here we find that Richelieu differs radically
from the other people of his time. The extreme view held for its
fundamental belief the idea that money is wealth. It follows that
a nation should always have a favorable balance of trade in order
(1). Schmoller, The Mercantile System t P. 54.
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to keep gold and silver within its boundaries and should never
let them go out of the land, because it is the possession of
specie that makes the state strong.
When the Cardinal took up the work of his administration
he believed more or less in this doctrine, which was commonly fol-
lowed and obeyed at that time. But as he began to study the eco-
nomic side of the question, as he was confronted with commercial
conditions in which the following of the idea was brought to light
in various ways, he gradually came to the conclusion that this
theory was wrong and as a result he admitted it in his Political
Testament . In referring to this change of economic doctrine, M.
Masson says that the other French officials still believed in
this theory, but Richelieu changed completely to the other side(l),
This is a very important event in the economic history of that
time, because it tends to locate the transitional stage of the
development of the mercantile doctrine to the belief in free-
trade, right in the age of Richelieu. Just what was the influ-
ence of the Cardinal's ideas on economic questions upon those
who came after him, would afford an excellent historical and
economical problem. That the Cardinal was not strictljr a follow-
er of either the old or the new school is quite evident from
a study of his life. He did not believe in the most essential
feature of the old mercantile system and yet was not a hearty ex-
ponent of the basic idea of the modern school of free trade.
-
One must place him, as was said before, in the transitional stage,
In other words, he was one of the mediums whereby the old views,
finally became merged into the new ones. For example, one of his
(I). Masson, p. 149.
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letters illustrates very well the modern view he possessed in
regard to duties on imports. "If one must endure," he says,
"the heavy import duties which foreign lands put upon our goods
which enter their lands and upon those which come to us, let us
charge such duties on their goods and raise them in proportion
as the foreigners raise their duties on us"(l). Thus he believed
in the system of retaliation, which might have led to freedom of
trade very easily if the proper conditions had been offered. As
a result it might be asserted that Richelieu deserved more con-
sideration on the economic side than has been given him hitherto,
and more indeed than this brief thesis has been able to devote
to him. The Cardinal may be regarded as a forerunner of the
exponents of the modern school of political economy, an event
which is worthy of study both from the historical an well as the
economic point of view.
In conclusion just a word concerning the economic im-
portance of Richelieu for his own age as well as for the future.
When Richelieu came into power, he found a nation without credit,
deeply in debt, and without an army or navy. In fact France was
in the very depths of poverty and ruin. His keen analytical mind
easier comprehended the economic necessities of the land and her
resources both geographically and industrially ( 2) . He believed
that his nation was ideally situated so far as commerce was con-
cerned, and that she was rich in natural resources which were
necessary for the building up of the nation. He realized this
and tried to take advantage of it. Everything was done with the
(1) . Richelieu's Letters , Vol. 2. p. 332.
(2) . Layallefe, Histoire de France,
,
Vol. 3, p. 476.
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intention of making France strong commercially as well as poli-
tically. "His treaties with England,' Holland, and Germany, and
his defiance of Spain were all economic policies," says D'Avenel.
"He extended the boundaries of France in order for her to be
secure'' (1). In other words, Richelieu did not take possession of
territory because of an intense desire to create an empire, but
simply because he wanted to strengthen the boundaries of France.
One notable example of his desire not to own land is found in his
treatment of Italy, where he took no territory ( 2 ) . He desired to
make France a strong commercial nation, and"in the spirit of reci-
procity, he gave to foreign merchandise the same rights as they
gave the French goods" (3). Thus, even though he left France
financially poor, because of his many wars, he gave an impetus
to the economic side of her development which v/ould have placed
her in the lead if other unforpseen events had not prevented the
successful outcome of his plans.
But why has Richelieu been neglected on the commercial
side? His political activities certainly deserve a prominent
place in any account of his life. But why should not the economic
traits of the man be given due consideration? He, who laid the
foundations for the comr.ercial supremacy of France and in doing
so did away with such internal disturbances as the growing power
of the Huguenots and Nobles, as well as the growing power, of Spain
and the pirates, surely deserves to be studied carefully from
(1) . Richelieu's Letters , Vol. I, p. LXXX.
(2) . Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert
, p. 137
(3) . Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Generale
, Vol. 5, p. 367.
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that point of view.
Now all these accomplishments must have raised the gen-
eral economic conditions of the people. In fact, the great force
which kept the people back was the tad financial system,which,
being broken down because of the wars, was a terrible strain on
them. But it really had to be borne, as the Cardinal, looking
into the future, realized that the present must suffer for the
benefit of the ages to come, if France was to become pov/erful,
and he acted accordingly. As a result, the people of modern France
have gained more from his political and economic policies than
did those of his day. After his death all his plans for the ex-
ternal growth of his nation dwindled down to almost nothing.
Then came Colbert. He tried to restore the foundations laid by
Richelieu and built upon by Ilazarin. But it was of no use. The
reckless ambition of his king, the splendour of the royal court,
and the unfortunate outcome of the political affairs in which
France was a party, all tended to ruin the building constructed
by this worthy follower of the Cardinal, and left the work of
the Cardinal again in a state of ruin and neglect (1).
A continual series of ups and downs has left France up
to the present time in about the same position, so far as her ex-
ternal commercial importance is concerned, that she was in during
the age of Richelieu. Nevertheless, the last few years have seen
a great change in this phase of her administration. She has
begun to pay more attention to her war marine and her colonization
projects. j-ndeed up to the present war, it would seem as if the
(I). Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert
, Parts i, 2, and 3. This
work treats of the accomplishment of Colbert as a logical outcome
Qf the act ivities o f r icJaeJ-ieu.. : :
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fundamental work carried out by Richelieu was to become a part
of a much greater commercial structure than France has hitherto
attained ( 1 )
.
"The deeds of great men live after them". In other
words, a man is truly great if he has accomplished something
which has a living force at the present time. All accounts of
Richelieu's life have brought out? clearly the importance of his
political side, but have failed to give similar attention to the
economic phases of his careet. This thesis has endeavored to
take up the external commercial policies of the Cardinal and
has thus limited itself to a part of the economic accomplish-
ments of the man. Tut in dealing with this phase of the subject,
it has tried to point out in general the fact that Richelieu
as measured by his activities in this particular field of his
administration, comes up to the requirement as to what consti-
tutes a great men. Two general contributions to economic thought
and practice have entitled him to this position. In the first
place, the Cardinal made an addition to the theoretical side of
economics by taking a stand in favor of trade and opposing the
extreme commercial doctrine. This beginning made by the Cardinal
finally developed into the modern doctrine of free trade. In the
second place, his ideas in regard to a war marine, colonization,
and commerce in general, have formed the basis, as has been said
before, of all activities in this particular field ever since
his time. Thus one sees in the economic policies of modern Franc
traces of the ideas of Richelieu, a man who lived centuries ago,
and for this reason he deserves a more important place in the
(1). Fracq, France under _the .Republic
,
pp. 50-74.
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field of political economy than has been granted him in the past.
Indeed he is a great man as measured by his accomplishments in
both the political and economic fields of his administration.
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